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Summary
Over the past three or four years, there has been small but steady output
of literature on temporary legislation. Law and economics scholarship first
examined temporary legislation in the early 1980s. During that time, sunset
legislation was being pushed by advocacy groups in an effort to limit the size
of the American central government of the late 1970s. Calabresi, in a book
entitled A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, was critical of the sunset
movement, and perhaps rightly so, since it failed to deliver on its promise.
Most sunset legislation was simply rubber-stamped for extension as soon as
it expired, and the movement itself did little to curb central expansion.
As the use of sunsets for legislative oversight began to wane, the scholar-
ship began to pay less and less attention to what it understood as a short-lived
phenomenon. Then in the early 2000s, the American legislature began pass-
ing a trickle of tax cuts and credits temporarily, and no longer were sunsets
simply rubber-stamped. The scholarship began to respond theoretically with
Garrett (2004) criticizing the practice and Yin (2009) supporting it. Today,
temporary taxation is shaping electoral outcomes by forcing tax issues onto
legislative agendas near election times. The impact of temporary taxation is
discussed in chapter 7.
Also amid controversy, legislation that faced strong opposition such as
the American Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (gun
control) and portions of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (domestic surveil-
lance) were passed temporarily. Temporary passage of domestic surveillance
laws also occurred in Germany and Australia around the same time.
Temporary legislation mitigates opposition since 1) temporary legislation
is easier to pass because it lasts for a shorter time, and 2) temporary legisla-
tion can positively impact social norms leading to increased compliance. This
means that lawmakers can optimally time their legal interventions with tem-
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porary laws by accounting for positive changes in social norms. For example,
over time they can pass a series of temporary extensions which benefit from
increased normative compliance, instead of a permanent law up front which
does not. This is the theoretical subject of chapter 2. Chapter 5 evaluates
the theory with an econometric study using 1025 bills from the 110th U.S.
Congress (2009-2010) and finds qualified support.
In some instances, legislators may prefer to legislate permanently even
when legislating temporarily appears more efficient in the short- to medium-
term. Chapter 3 develops a theory of why legislators prefer more costly
permanent legislation by emphasizing their ability to create social norms
through lawmaking. While older legislators nearing retirement may not ac-
crue tangible benefits such as a stream of lobby transfers, they choose to
legislate permanently because they value leaving a normative legacy. Chap-
ter 6 measures the impact of age on the choice of a permanent timing rule,
and finds that older lawmakers prefer permanent laws that originate in cer-
tain Congressional committees and not others.
By the mid-2000s, it was clear that the choice of temporary versus per-
manent legislation considered issues beyond legislative oversight and curbing
central expansion. The choice is rich with strategic considerations between
current legislatures and future legislatures, as seen in taxation, and between
the legislature and citizens, as seen in socially controversial policy domains.
Yet a further strategic interaction can be induced with temporary legislation
between the legislature and a lobby. Gersen (2007) provides a case study
of the temporary passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 to
illustrate, and chapter 4 models this interaction referencing that case study
throughout. It shows that temporary legislation can induce lobbies to reveal
information that is useful for future extensions of legislation, and that under
certain conditions, temporary legislation and not permanent legislation can
actually signal the legislature's commitment to a policy.
In sum, the choice of temporary versus permanent legislation is strate-
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gic in nature. This fact is a reflection of the interdependencies between the
legislature and citizens, the legislature and a lobby, and a current legislature
and a future legislature. In each relationship, the decision to legislate tem-
porarily or permanently depends on the action chosen by the other group.
The strategic problem arises because the group's choice of action is not in-
dependent; it is affected by the legislature's choice. Throughout this book,
an action chosen by citizens, a lobby, or a future legislature is conceptualized
as a potential benefit that accrues to the legislature. It takes the form of in-
creased citizen compliance, revealed lobby information, and reduced political
opponent popularity.
In exchange for the benefit, the legislature pays a cost, i.e. the trans-
actions cost of either temporary or permanent legislation. Here lies the op-
portunity for the legislature. Because each type of legislation allocates costs
to different points in time, the legislature can wait for something favorable
to happen before incurring the full cost of the legislation. In the case of an
interaction with citizens, the legislature can wait for the law to manifest an
expressive effect. In the case of the interaction with a lobby, the legislature
can wait for the law to induce information revelation. And in the case of an
interaction with a future legislature, the current legislature can wait for the
law to reduce an opponent's popularity. Each of these benefits may not have
occurred given a permanent enactment, or even if they did occur, they may
not have been possible to accrue unless paid for a with a temporary legis-
lation cost structure. In some circumstances, both the legislature and the
other group benefit, and the use of temporary provisions creates possibilities
for joint maximization. In other circumstances, those benefits may not occur
at all or are outweighed by other costs. Under those conditions, permanent
provisions should be used in order to maximize social welfare.
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